mental processes can be understood as computational processes. Pylyshyn (1986) writes that 'Cognition is a type of computation ' (p. xiii) . The 'new anti-cognitivists', on the other hand, push the focus of psychology away from the workings of the mind to the agent's interactions with the environment. The emerging alternative models psychology not on cognition, but on action. What is at the heart of that dispute is our presumed relationship to the world. The cognitivists presume the relationship to be one of knowing, inference, cognition-what the new anti-cognitivists call critically a 'spectator stance'. The new anti-cognitivists claim that the agent stands in a different relation, as a kind of ongoing engagement with the world. Framed in this way, the difference between the two approaches is quite vague and, at this level of abstraction, not helpful. Certainly, it does not provide any way to test the two views. The purpose of this paper is to eliminate some of that vagueness by examining a standard cognitivist explanation.
There is no one explanation that is held to be true by all cognitivists. But there is a kind of explanation that is held to be true. I will try to show that this kind of explanation misses a broad class of well-established phenomena. If so, it illustrates what is missing from the cognitivist picture and it provides some of the motivation for the new anti-cognitivists.
It should be noted at the outset that I don't deny what philosophers and historians of science have taught us in the last forty years, namely that adjudication between competing scientific theories is not simple. And certainly, there won't be a smoking gun. All theories can be modified, come what may. All theories can be saved from recalcitrant data by modifying the theory. There is a very large literature on this topic (see, e.g., Duhem, 1914 Duhem, /1981 Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1980; Quine, 1951 Quine, /1961 . The bottom line is that there are no crucial experiments. I don't think the following critique of cognitivism is a knock-down blow, because there are no knock-down blows. A position can always be modified. But a blow can shift the burden of proof. It puts the ball in the other court. If cognitivists continually change their position to incorporate their critics' insights and discoveries, the name might survive but the content of the position has shifted. In fact, I will argue just that. I will argue that the actual research done by cognitive psychologists has outgrown their research paradigm. These experimenters know more than the official theory. Cognitivist theory is not sufficiently rich to account for the experimental findings.
None of what is being argued here will address cognitivism in general. I am only focusing on perception. The standard cognitivist theory of perception has a name. It is called the 'inferential theory of perception'.
The inferential theory of perception, hereafter ITP, is easily the bestknown theory of perception and perhaps the most intuitive theory. It is the one that easily comes to mind if a person introspects on the perceptual process. Most textbooks on perception and most introductions to the subject treat it as the correct view (see, e.g., Goldstein, 2001; Gregory, 1998; Hoffman, 1998; Rock, 1983) . The basic idea is that the sensory input stands in the same relationship to the percept as evidence does to a conclusion. Perception functions as a logical inference. Perception understood in this way is a rational process and, as such, an instance of cognition.
If ITP were correct, it would simplify many matters. Since inference is relatively well understood, we can transfer that understanding to perception. For instance, it would help to explain at least some cases of perceptual error, where perceptual error would simply be a case of an inferential error. Further, an ITP would be a positive step in the direction of solving one of the hardest problems in psychology: how different psychological subsystems interface. While there has been good empirical and theoretical work in many areas of psychology, such as language, decision-making, and so on, it is far from clear how these systems interact. An ITP would not solve that problem, because it in and of itself does not solve how the physiological changes on the retina get transduced into premises of an inference. But, at least it would be clearer how the output of the perceptual system and cognition would interact, given that the perceptual system would be part of the cognitive system.
I am going to argue that, in spite of the fact that the inferential theory of perception has been useful for organizing a vast amount of seemingly conflicting data and has played a central role in the history of the psychology of perception, the inferential theory of perception no longer functions to make perceptual relationships perspicuous. In fact, it conceals what is happening in perception, because the theory is not sufficiently rich to encompass some necessary distinctions and it cannot be modified without losing its character as an inferential account.
The Structure of the Inferential Theory of Perception

ITP consists of the following claims:
(A) The sentential thesis. The operative unit of information in perception is a proposition or a sentence. This is required since inference only operates on truth-bearing units: that is, what is required is a mental state that functions as a sentence. Inferentiality implies the sentential thesis. In short, ITP is committed to some version of a 'language of thought' thesis (Fodor, 1980) . 1 (A1) The knowledge thesis. The agent takes the subset of sentences that pertain to the nature of the world, such as 'objects tend to be rigid', as knowledge (or perhaps true belief). Whether that subset is knowledge or is simply taken to be knowledge turns on an issue independent of ITP, namely the origin of those sentences. Historically, of course, Descartes held that since the relevant sentences came from a non-deceiving God, they were guaranteed to be true, and thus knowledge. In a more contemporary vein, if one holds at least some versions of an adaptationist reading of natural selection (i.e. natural selection generates over time an optimal fit between the organism and the environment), then, all things being equal, one would hold that the agent has knowledge (or true beliefs). Regardless of how the relevant sentences are true, those versions of ITP commit one to a specific analysis of perceptual failure: the agent misapplies that knowledge. For instance, Gregory (1997) writes, 'Errors of perception (phenomena of illusions) can be due to knowledge being inappropriate or being misapplied ' (p. 1121) . In other versions of ITP, agents only have to believe they have knowledge. Under such versions, there is a different analysis of perceptual failure, namely that the agent lacks the relevant true sentences.
It should be noted that these cognitivist explanations are not taken to be sufficient to explain all illusions. Everyone agrees that there can be many causes of illusions. Proponents of ITP do not deny that there can be purely physiological causes for illusions that cannot be expressed in cognitive and inferential terms (for a discussion of this issue, see Coren, Girgus, & Day, 1973) .
(B) The poverty of the stimulus thesis. The information in the perceptual stimulus underdetermines the information in the perceptual output. If there were no gap between the input and the output, perception would not be a problem-solving activity. There would be no reason to introduce the language of inference. Here is how Pylyshyn (1986) describes the situation:
. . . organisms can respond selectively to properties in the environment that are not specifiable physically, such properties as being beautiful, being a sentence of English, or being a chair or a shoe. These properties are not properties involved in physical laws; they are not projectable properties . . . a system's capacity to respond selectively to nonprojectable properties . . .
[is] what differentiates inferencing systems from systems that merely react causally to environmental stimulation. (p. 15, italics mine) While there are many problems in understanding perception, the inferential theory of perception was engineered to solve the poverty of the stimulus. Or to put it differently, the other problems of perception (such as stereopsis, edge detection, face perception, etc.) are analyzed in terms of the poverty of the stimulus: that is, the poverty of the stimulus thesis is that the central problem of perception is the poverty of the stimulus.
Take, for instance, the problem of stereopsis, as described by David Marr (1982) . Stereopsis is the ability of the brain to infer from the input of two eyes 'the relative distances of the objects from the viewer. . . . The reason why the task of identifying corresponding locations in the two images is difficult is because of the false target problem', which is the name of the poverty of the stimulus problem for stereopsis. Marr continues, This occurs in what may be its extreme form in Julesz's random-dot stereograms. . . .The question is, Which dot corresponds to which? The left eye here sees four dots, and the right eye sees four, but which corresponds to which? Apriori, all of the 16 possible matches are plausible candidates, but when we observe such a stereo pair we tend to make the correct pairings. . . . What we need is some additional information to help us decide which matchings are correct by constraining them in some way. (pp. 111-112) Marr understands the problem of stereopsis in terms of the poverty of the stimulus.
Broadly speaking, the poverty of the stimulus thesis has two interpretations: the quantity of information interpretation and the quality of information interpretation. The quantity of information interpretation is the claim that the stimulus has less information than the perceptual output. But, as it is well known, 'No one knows how to quantify the relevant notion of information, so it is hard to show conclusively that this sort of argument [i.e. the poverty of stimulus thesis] is sound' (Fodor, 1985, p. 2) . Dennett (1987 Dennett ( /1989 The quality of information interpretation is the claim that the information in the stimulus is the wrong type or kind of information for the perceptual output. For instance, it is usually taken that the information in the stimulus is best couched in physiological language, while the information in the perceptual output is best couched in mentalist language. So the quality of information interpretation amounts to the claim that there is no type-type translation between the proprietary language of the stimulus and the proprietary language of the perceptual output. The Pylyshyn quote above is an example of the quality of information interpretation of the stimulus.
Denials of the poverty of stimulus thesis generate so-called 'direct perception' accounts. They deny both interpretations. 'Direct perception' accounts need to show both that the stimulus and output should be couched in the same kinds and that the quantity of information in the input is sufficient for generating the output. The denial of the quality of information interpretation is on the surface more problematic. But it is achieved by claiming that the optimal language for describing the input and the output is the same, thus eliminating the mismatch. For instance, idealists argue that the stimulus and the output are both ideal; eliminative behaviorists treat the stimulus and the output as both behavioral; Gibsonians treat the stimulus and RICHEIMER: FAMILIARITY AND ITP 509 the output as both 'ecological'. In any case, such accounts do not treat perceptual systems qua perceptual systems as intelligent. The 'intelligence' of perception is not located in the perceptual system. It is located in the ecological order via natural selection, in the world mind, social practices or some neural center other than the perceptual.
In short, for ITP, perception should be understood as a problem-solving activity aimed at solving the poverty of the stimulus problem, and, as such, perception should be considered an intelligent system. Again Fodor (1985) :
What demonstrates that perceptual processes are smart is Poverty of Stimulus Arguments. . . . A Poverty of Stimulus Argument alleges that there is typically more information in a perceptual response than there is in the proximal stimulus that prompts that response: hence perceptual integration must somehow involve a contribution of information by the perceiving organism. (p. 2) (C) The percept as a hypothesis thesis. The percept is not just a set of sentences, but a set of hypothetical sentences. The plausibility that a percept is a hypothesis increases when one considers the percept as a set of predictions. When I see something as a chair, I am predicting that if I observe it from the appropriate position, I will see that it has a back; if I touch it, it will be resistant; if I lay my hand on it, it will not bite me, and so on. These predictions are part and parcel of the perception that 'that is a chair'. This reading of the percept makes evolutionary sense. Perception functions to guide behavior. A percept as a set of sensations or an image, and so on, would not have the predictive power as a set of predictive sentences. 'Perceptions are hypotheses, predicting unsensed characteristics of objects . . . to compensate neural signaling delay. . . . So "reaction time" is generally avoided. . . . Time prediction frees higher animals from the tyranny of control by reflexes, to allow intelligent behavior into anticipated futures' (Gregory, 1997 (Gregory, , p. 1122 .
(D) The percept as determinate. The percept is non-ambiguous. The perceptual process does not typically terminate until it has a determinate percept. According to ITP, all perceptual situations are inherently ambiguous. They can be read in multiple ways. That is, of course, a restatement of the poverty of the stimulus thesis. The function of the perceptual system is to eliminate that ambiguity. This is not to deny that there are some carefully crafted stimuli, such as a Necker cube, that can frustrate the perceptual system and prevent it from reaching a single percept. But proponents of ITP are quick to point out that even in the case of a Necker cube, one's percept flips back and forth between two determinate percepts. One does not see both simultaneously.
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Using the Marr example of stereopsis again, the perceptual system faces an ambiguous situation. The ambiguity is part and parcel of how information is delivered to the visual system. The perceptual system enriches the input with what Marr (1982) calls 'the fundamental assumption of stereopsis', which is a set of constraints on how to match the inputs from the left and right eyes. Marr writes, 'It follows immediately from this assumption that the correspondence must be unique' (p. 115). The perceptual system infers a determinate output. To summarize, quoting Marr again, 'the true heart of visual perception is the inference from the structure of an image about the structure of the real world outside' (p. 68, italics mine) (F) The unconscious inference thesis. ITP in its current forms holds that the inference is unconscious. ITP does not logically entail the unconscious inference thesis. Historically, there have been versions of ITP that have denied (F), but since Helmholtz, it has been a standard feature of all significant ITP accounts. The unconscious inference thesis is not only supported by the fact that we do not actually experience perception as an inference; it is supported, more importantly, by the fact that as we have learned more about perception, we have learned how immensely complicated it is. We have learned that the percept is the product of multiple processes working simultaneously. For Helmholtz and his intellectual descendants, perception is the product of the multiple lines of inference working simultaneously. Such inferences are not experienced by the perceiver.
As such, ITP in its current form as unconscious inference is a theoretical claim. It is not an observational claim. Of course, transforming ITP from an observational/introspective claim to a theoretical claim adds an extra burden of proof to the proponents of ITP.
(F1) The computational thesis. The computational thesis is a claim about how ITP can be implemented. How is it possible for the brain to implement inferences? The answer is not mysterious if the brain is on an abstract level a computer. We can implement the inferences as computations of a physical symbol system. It should be no surprise that a computer can do this: computations are inferences. A computer (i.e., a physical implementation of a Turing machine) is an inference-making machine, or, as it was originally called, a 'logic machine'. Computers are physical machines that transform physical symbols using the rules of logic.
The computational thesis can be understood in at least two ways, one weak and one strong. The weak computational claim adds little to ITP other RICHEIMER: FAMILIARITY AND ITP 511 than the fact that it shows how one can physically implement ITP computationally. I suspect all proponents of ITP accept the weak claim. But there is a strong version of the computational thesis, best expressed by Marr (1982) . It creates a new standard, a new expectation, for an explanation. One has not provided an explanation for, for example, stereopsis unless one can map out step by step the transformations from the input to the output: that is to say, unless one can produce the algorithm or, in other words, write a computer program for stereopsis. This strong version of the computational thesis is not accepted by every proponent of ITP. However, Marr's research program is extremely influential, even if his particular hypotheses are not always accepted.
Alternatives to the Inferential Theory of Perception
It should be stated up front that there are a number of alternatives to ITP that deny that the relationship between the stimulus and the percept is a matter of inference. Each of the alternatives can be understood as an attack on one or more of the above claims. Connectionists, at least under many interpretations of connectionism (e.g., Churchland, 1989) , attack (A), the sentential claim. They assert that there are no sentences there at all, and that distributions of changing weights do not map on to sentences. Gibson (1966) attacks (B), the poverty of the stimulus thesis. He claims that the stimulus is richer than ITP would have us believe, hence the perceiver does not infer, except under informationally impoverished situations. Proponents of 'Behavioral Robotics' (sometimes called the 'New Robotics') attack (C), that perception terminates in a set of sentences (hypothetical or otherwise). They see perception as a dynamic phenomenon consisting in perception-action loops where perception and action feed into one another. They claim that by treating perception as an inference an inferential account loses the temporal feature of perception (e.g., Brooks, 1999) . Under such a view, ITP is simply an artifact, a momentary snapshot of an event that occurs over time. Merleau-Ponty (1962) accepts (B), the poverty of the stimulus thesis, but attacks (D), the claim that the percept is determinate. He claims that the phenomenology of our perception shows that when we perceive, for instance, the top of a cylinder from an angle other than a right angle, we perceive neither a circle nor an ellipse, but rather a fluctuating and nonstable shape. Some proponents of fuzzy logic hold a similar view. They claim that successful skilled action requires that the terminus of perception is 'fuzzy ' (e.g., von Altrock, 1995) . Anscombe (1971 Anscombe ( /1981 attacks the claim that the inferential theory of perception is non-conscious. She challenges the notion of non-conscious evidence as incoherent.
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Gregory's Version of the Inferential Theory of Perception
I am going to examine one version of ITP, Richard Gregory's account, which is in some ways a paradigmatic example of ITP. Gregory is noncontroversially one of the leading proponents of ITP. His popular textbook, Eye and Brain, which represents this view, is in its fifth edition, and has been continuously in print, though in revised editions, since 1966. It is paradigmatic, not because everyone accepts it, but because, lacking the bells and whistles of later versions of ITP, it gives one ready access to the kind of explanation that ITP offers. The logic of Gregory's explanations can be seen on the surface. Marr's more sophisticated explanations (more sophisticated because he holds the strong computationalist thesis, i.e. he puts greater demand on what counts as explanation) have the effect, for our purposes, of making it difficult to see what he is doing. Marr is providing an inferential account of perception, but the complexity of his account masks the logic of his explanation. In any case, Gregory's account is not paradigmatic in all aspects. His approach is top-down and he never exploited the power of the computational model of the mind. In this regard, his work does not represent the most current thinking. Nevertheless, the basic theoretical program is laid out in a perspicuous fashion in Gregory's work. I will argue that a problem evident in his work is in fact present in ITP in general, including its most recent incarnations, because the problem is at the heart of ITP.
I will use as an example of an ITP explanation Gregory's explanation of the Müller-Lyer illusion. His explanation is heavily cited, well known, and is paradigmatic of inferentialist explanations. He claims, not surprisingly, that we rely on some stored knowledge. First, the brain/mind knows that distant objects appear smaller than they really are. It corrects for distance by size constancy, or what Gregory calls 'constancy scaling'. Misapplying constancy scaling is going to be at the heart of the explanation of the Müller-Lyer illusion: 'in constancy scaling we find known processes which not only could but must also produce distortion of visual space if the scaling is set inappropriately to the distance of an observed object' (Gregory, 1974b, p. 346) . The next step is to show that a two-dimensional display (such as the Müller-Lyer illusion) which has 'features normally associated with distance' can trigger constancy scaling. To see how this works in the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion, it is best to consider the illusion in a vertical position, that is, not how it is usually shown with the lines of the arrows running horizontal. The mind/brain sees the wings of the arrows, given our experience, as corners of a room. Our rooms are typically right-angled. We then misapply the lessons we have learned from seeing the corners of a room to the two-dimensional diagram. Third, because the lines are the same length on the retina, constancy scaling incorrectly adjusts the image: 'The parts of the figures corresponding to distant objects are expanded and the parts corresponding to nearer objects are reduced' (p. 343). In short, Gregory is Gregory has considerable evidence to defend this explanation. Some of the evidence is based on experiments (e.g., the Müller-Lyer arrows 'look like corners and not like flat projections when presented as luminous figures in the dark' [p. 347], i.e. not as a two-dimensional display); some of it is based on case studies (e.g. a person who regains sight after a lifetime of blindness has neither constancy scaling nor the illusions); some of it is based on cross-cultural studies (e.g., Gregory's explanation predicts that people who were raised in round houses, such as traditional Zulus, should have weaker Müller-Lyer effects than people who live in right-angled environments, and they do) (Gregory, 1974a (Gregory, , 1974b (Gregory, , 1974c .
Difficulties in Showing that Perception is Inferential
But even if all of this is correct, none of this is sufficient to prove that perception is an inferential process. To show that perception is inferential, Gregory needs to demonstrate (among other things) that the changes in perception vary with the changes in knowledge, that knowledge is the operative variable. He needs to show that it is the change of knowledge qua knowledge that caused the change in perception, that the misapplied knowledge of the corners of rooms is doing the work.
Gregory knows (as does every proponent of ITP) that the prima facie evidence does not support the claim that knowledge is the operative variable. He knows that knowledge (understood in any conventional way) does not change perception, that perception is 'cognitively impenetrable'. Gregory is well aware that knowing that the Müller-Lyer illusion is an illusion does not eliminate it. And he is well aware that knowing the cause of the illusion, for example his explanation, does not eliminate it. So how is Gregory able to reconcile the fact of cognitive impenetrability with his thesis that perception varies with changes in knowledge? He does so by claiming that the knowledge involved in perception (what he calls 'perceptual knowledge') is isolated from ordinary knowledge (what he calls 'conceptual knowledge'). He writes, It is significant that . . . illusions are experienced perceptually though the observer knows conceptually that they are illusory-even to the point of appreciating the causes of the phenomena. This does not, however, show that knowledge has no part to play in vision. Rather, it shows that conceptual and perceptual knowledge are largely separate. (Gregory, 1997 (Gregory, , p. 1123 Gregory's response is, of course, an instance of the 'modularity thesis' (see, e.g., Fodor, 1984) 
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is knowledge-based with the empirical finding of cognitive impenetrability. The modularity move is a concession that the prima facie evidence does not support the knowledge thesis and that more work needs to be done to demonstrate it.
Obviously, the modularity thesis as a move to preserve ITP from the prima facie evidence is only sustainable if Gregory's 'perceptual knowledge' is in fact knowledge. Otherwise, it is simply an ad hoc move to preserve a theory from counter-evidence. I am going to argue that Gregory's 'perceptual knowledge' is not knowledge. I will not object to the claim that there are some knowledge-like elements in the grab-bag concept of 'perceptual knowledge' (such as knowledge of optical principles), but I will argue that there is an unknowledge-like component that is essential for perception. And I will argue that this is easiest understood (following both ordinary and psychological usage) as 'familiarity'.
Gregory would not dispute the latter claim. There is no dispute that familiarity is a relevant variable. It is familiarity with a right-angled environment that is a central component of Gregory's explanation of the Müller-Lyer illusion. And it is the lack of familiarity of some people (e.g. Zulus who were raised in traditional homes) that is used to explain their weaker susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion. But Gregory would insist (as would all proponents of ITP) that familiarity is constituted by sentences (or propositions) and is knowledge. They have to argue that if familiarity is not knowledge, then ITP is false. I am going to argue that familiarity is not knowledge.
To summarize, if familiarity can be classed as knowledge, then Gregory is in the process of showing that perception is an inferential process because he would be on his way to showing that the perceptual process consists of knowledge claims. But if it turns out that familiarity cannot be classed as knowledge, then the perceptual process can't be inferential. It can't be inferential because for ITP to work, all of the perceptual process needs to be inferential. This is not to say that there isn't a sensory role in perception, but the sensory would have to be converted to a propositional format for the inference to operate. For inference to occur, the units of the inference must link with each other via truth, otherwise there would be no inference. Otherwise, to quote Wittgenstein (1963) , it would operate as 'a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism' (section 271). Familiarity would have to be propositional.
Further, for ITP to be a correct description of the perceptual process, familiarity would have to be propositional at the time that perceptual process is at work. It very well might be true that after the fact we talk about perception as inferential, but it would not follow that perception operates inferentially. And it is obviously true that if I am asked to explicate my familiarity with some item, I rely on propositions or sentences. But how we talk about perception might not be the same as how we perceive. Or to restate this in the current jargon, the mind's view of the mind need not be the same as the brain's view of the mind. The point here is similar to the wellknown Kantian distinction between following a rule and being described by a rule. The motion of the planets can be correctly described by a rule, but the planets are not following a rule. Even if familiarity can be restated as knowledge, that does not show that it operates in the perceptual process as knowledge at the time the perceptual process is at work. If familiarity is not propositional, in that sense, and if familiarity is important to the perceptual process, then ITP is in trouble.
Problems with Explaining Familiarity as Knowledge
There are two worries about explaining familiarity as knowledge. The first is an intuitive worry. It is not clear what weight an intuitive objection should have. But just the same, there is an intuitive difficulty in explaining familiarity as knowledge. There is an important intuitive distinction between familiarity and knowledge. To be knowledge, familiarity would have to be shown to be constituted by propositional, that is, truth-bearing, states, otherwise there is no inference. Inference requires truth. Further, in order for those states to be truth-bearing, they need to be discrete states. But, intuitively, does familiarity work that way? Assuming familiarity is necessary for perception (a point that Gregory does not dispute), the thesis that familiarity is knowledge is, from an intuitive point of view, problematic. Obviously, familiarity, unlike knowledge, is a continuous variable. One is more or less familiar. It is not a discrete state. Very roughly, familiarity is a direct function of exposure. That will be qualified below. In the case of knowledge, either I know or I don't know. But familiarity is always a matter of degree. As a continuous variable, it is environmentally sensitive in a way that knowledge is not. In short, familiarity is an analog concept; knowledge is a digital concept.
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But beyond any intuitive worries, there is a second difficulty with treating familiarity as knowledge, and this is at the heart of the problem. Empirically, it had better not be the case that familiarity is knowledge. If it is, then one loses the distinction between familiarity and knowledge. We need that distinction. ITP can't have such a distinction because, for ITP, familiarity is constituted by knowledge claims. It is knowledge. But without that distinction, ITP loses well-established empirical discoveries. ITP would have us expect that since illusions don't decline with knowledge; illusions don't decline with familiarity-since familiarity is taken to be knowledge. The problem for ITP is that most perceptual illusions do decline with familiarity, while they do not decline with knowledge-which is just to say it is a mistake to treat familiarity as knowledge. That empirical claim has two parts. The first part is not controversial among proponents of ITP-illusions don't THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 16 (4) 516 decline with knowledge. That was discussed above as 'cognitive impenetrability'. The modularity thesis is supposed to block the negative implications of that for ITP. But that is not sufficient to sustain ITP. ITP needs to block the negative implications of the other part of the empirical claim-that most illusions do decline with familiarity. That second part should be controversial for proponents of ITP, but that is not dealt with. The diminishment of perceptual illusions is called 'illusion decrement'. It has been studied for over 100 years. (For brief overviews of the literature, see Coren & Girgus, 1978; Robinson, 1972 .) It is a well-established phenomenon. There are numerous studies measuring illusion decrement along different dimensions (inspection time, type of figure, etc.), comparing variables (practice, prolonged inspection, selective adaptation), whether the decrement transfers to illusions not observed, whether decrement varies with age, gender, and so on. For instance, twenty-seven studies use the term 'illusion decrement' in their abstract according to PsycINFO (1967-present) . The actual number of articles discussing illusion decrement might be larger since illusion decrement is also sometimes referred to as illusion diminution, illusion destruction, and so on.
Illusion decrement is not dealt with by ITP because it simply does not have the resources to do so. It can't deal with familiarity that is not knowledge. ITP owes us a motivated story why most illusions don't decline with knowledge, but do decline with familiarity. ITP can't deal with familiarity because familiarity points to a kind of relationship between the agent and the world other than the inferential, the propositional or the cognitive. Given this, it should be no surprise that illusion decrement is not acknowledged by proponents of ITP. I could not find any references to illusion decrement, even a critical reference, in the writings of the leading proponents of ITP, such as Fodor, Gregory, Hoffman, Marr, Pylyshyn, Rock or in any of the major textbooks. Yet it is a widely studied phenomenon.
To understand what the cognitivists can't conceptualize, one has to see the alternative. Often one cannot see what one is doing until one formulates an alternative. So, I would argue that even if the new anti-cognitivists turn out to be wrong, and it is too early to tell one way or the other, they have forced a greater clarity on what we mean by 'cognitivism'.
The term 'familiarity' is, as an ordinary English word, rich with associations and meanings. To make it into a technical term guarantees some misunderstandings. Obviously, there will be ordinary meanings of the term that will not be included in the technical meaning. Clearly, there are ways to use the ordinary word 'familiarity' that can be construed as knowledge. So if I say, 'I am familiar with linear algebra', I mean something like, 'I have some knowledge of linear algebra.' And that means, from a cognitivist point of view, there are some true sentences about linear algebra in my 'belief box' (see Fodor, 1987) . RICHEIMER: FAMILIARITY AND ITP 517 But I will argue there is also another sense to the ordinary term, which is why it seems worthwhile incorporating the ordinary term in our technical vocabulary. The following discussion can be seen as working out the implications of Dewey's classic paper, 'The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology' (1896). 'Familiarity'-in the sense that is being identified here-is not knowledge. It consists of a more intimate relation with the world than knowledge. In ordinary parlance, it is 'being at home' with the phenomenon. Dewey proposed that, in addition to knowledge, we have continuous feedback loops between the agent and the world that operate over the boundary of the skin. Obviously, part of that loop is not stored in the central nervous system. These feedback loops exist while we are engaged in the task, so that in effect the proper unit of psychological analysis is not knowledge or the stored sentence in the brain but the task at hand. And they exist only as long as we are engaged in that task. For Dewey, this should not be considered knowledge, because it is not wholly in the head. Knowledge consists of propositions, sentences, representations, and so on, that are stored in the brain. What is stored in the brain, for Dewey, is ways to exploit the world.
An example of research that can be described as operating in this tradition is the work of the 'New Roboticists'. In such research, for instance, Rodney Brooks (1999) describes six-legged robots whose movements are not programmed via a central processor, that is, a simulated brain that commands each leg motion. Rather, each leg has its own processor. Each leg is relatively autonomous. There are some links, mainly inhibitory, between the legs. When one leg moves, it, in effect, destabilizes the other legs. They respond by re-establishing a stability, which in turn destabilizes the other legs. The result is walking. The key point here is that the legs are not connected to each other through a brain that commands each movement; rather, the legs are connected to each other through the world. The best explanation for the movement is not one of inputs and outputs, but one of interaction with the world. Brooks (1999) , describing one of his robots, writes, 'Herbert showed many instances of using the world as its own best model and as a communication medium. The remarkable thing about Herbert is that there was absolutely no internal communication between any of its behavior generating modules' (p. 121). The sophistication of the robot's movements is not due to a central program, but it is due to how it interacts with the world. As Herbert Simon (1996) wrote on the complexity of ants' movements:
We watch an ant make his laborious way across a wind-and wave-molded beach . . . the ant's path is irregular, complex, hard to describe. But its complexity is really a complexity in the surface of the beach, not a complexity in the ant. (p. 51) THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 16(4) 518 Under this view, the perceptual system is not just detecting distal objects in the world (it does that), but in addition it monitors relations between the organism and the world. Gibsonian 'looming effects' are an example of such a relation. An agent can tell whether an object is moving toward the agent or if the agent itself is moving purely from the visual stimulus. In the former case, the object appears to be expanding while the background remains constant. In the latter case, the object and the background are expanding at the same rate. What is important for our purpose here is that information about the world and the agent is intricately, 'intimately' linked. If an organism can detect looming effects, it can detect not only whether an object is moving toward it but whether it is in motion, its relative rate of motion, its relative direction, and so on. In other words, perception of looming effects is revealing a relation between the organism and the environment.
To get clearer on this, an analogy might help. There are at least two kinds of velocity-average velocity and instantaneous velocity. When we describe how fast we were driving, we naturally report our average velocity. 'I was late because the traffic was bad and I could only drive 50 mph,' and so on. Our excuses rely on a 'historical' property, average velocity. While that information plays a useful and important role in our justifications, we do not use that information for driving. Automobile manufacturers, for good reason, don't provide average velocity detectors, though they could. Instead, they provide detectors of instantaneous velocity (speedometers). The analogy is useful because, first, a speedometer detects in real time a relation between the automobile and the road. What is being detected is not a 'historical' property. What is detected is an ongoing relationship. It exists only as long as the agent is interacting with a bit of the world and disappears the moment the agent ceases to act with that bit. It is not stored or represented beyond the moment of use. Second, the analogy is useful because instantaneous velocity does not exist as a property independent of the automobile and the road. It is that relation. In this case, instantaneous velocity as a perceptual property is more like an obstacle than it is like a tree. Even though a tree can function as an obstacle, an 'obstacle' is the name for a relation specific to the organism's motor capabilities and a bit of the environment. A tree is not the name of a relation. It tells you nothing about the perceiving organism. It is simply an object in the world, while what counts as an 'obstacle' tells you about the perceiving organism. Third, the new anti-cognitivists, since they see perception as linked to action and not to knowledge, see the perceptual system as typically detecting obstacles as opposed to trees. Such properties are necessary to connect perception with successful action. They are action-linked properties as opposed to reflective properties (such as an obstacle as opposed to a tree, such as instantaneous velocity as opposed to average velocity, etc.). Fourth, the analogy is useful because it displays the intimacy involved. Automobiles stand in a specific relationship to the road (obviously not because of natural selection but because humans design automobiles with roads in mind and they design roads with automobiles in mind). Fifth, the analogy is useful because automobiles do not detect instantaneous velocity via inference. It is simply calibrated from the motion of the tires. Average velocity is detected by inference. Of course, as with all analogies, the analogy breaks down. Automobiles do not adapt to their environments, and hence they are not 'familiar' with their environment. They don't adapt themselves to the shape of the local environment. But what is important here is that the important variable for driving, instantaneous velocity, is not the outcome of an inference.
This brings us back to the Müller-Lyer illusion. In one sense of the ordinary term, we all are, of course, 'familiar' with the Müller-Lyer illusion, that is, we all have knowledge about it. But in another sense of the ordinary term, we might or might not be familiar with the Müller-Lyer illusion in the sense of interacting with it. Merely seeing the Müller-Lyer illusion does cause illusion decrement. One must look at it from different angles. One's eyes must be able to move freely over the illusion. One must interact with the illusion. Coren and Girgus (1978) in a review of the literature on illusion decrement write, 'A number of studies have been conducted in which one group of observers was allowed to scan the figure while other groups of observers were required to fixate a portion of the array' (p. 184). Referring to these studies, they continue, 'all report that little or no decrement of the Müller-Lyer illusion occurs under conditions of fixation, as opposed to a marked weakening of the illusion when systematic eye movements are permitted over the figure' (p. 184). The oldest of these studies dates from 1908. This is a robust, well-established, phenomenon, well known to experimenters, but ignored by the received theory. In, for instance, the 1908 study, Coren and Girgus write that E.O. Lewis 'briefly flashed a Müller-Lyer stimulus and found that even after thousands of presentations spaced over several days little diminution or decrement of the illusory magnitude occurs' (p. 184). By flashing the stimulus, the experimenter prevented any interaction, any exploration. The experimenter allowed the subjects to be familiar with the illusion in the sense of having knowledge of it, forming beliefs about it, seeing it, and so on. But by flashing the illusion, the experimenter prevented the subjects from being familiar with the illusion in the sense of interacting with it, of exploring it, of forming Dewey's feedback loops. This is consistent with a body of literature that has been studied under the rubric of 'psychological adaptation' (as distinct from physiological adaptation or selective adaptation). Psychological adaptation is a more direct, or intimate, relationship between the agent and the world than is inference. In well-known studies that date back to the early 1960s, Richard Held showed that adaptation to various devices that distorted visual perception, such as inverted lenses, mirrors, and so on, was greatly enhanced by allowing the agent freely to interact with the stimulus. The crucial variable for adaptation is that the movement must be 'self-produced movement' (Held, 1965) .
The crucial point is not only that illusion decrement requires a distinction between knowledge and a technical sense of familiarity, a distinction that is not available to ITP, but that under the technical sense of familiarity, namely free eye movements, the poverty of the stimulus thesis is false. If one allows the subject to form Dewey's feedback loops, the subject would self-correct the percept (see, e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1978; Held, 1965) . Granted it takes time, but that should be no surprise. The visual system is a physical system that operates over time. To the extent that the poverty of the stimulus thesis is false, the motivation for ITP is undermined.
This also points to the explanation as to why some illusions, such as the moon illusion, cannot decrease. The moon illusion meets all of the conditions of being a cognitive illusion. But there is no illusion decrement with the moon. It looks larger on the horizon than it does overhead no matter how much one looks at the moon. But the explanation is clear from the point of view of this reading of 'familiarity'. Being earthbound, regardless of how much I move, I cannot explore the moon. The moon is so far away that all of my movements are functionally irrelevant. Of course, if interaction is a necessary feature of the technical sense of 'familiarity', then I am not strictly speaking familiar with the moon, in the technical sense. That, of course, points to the problem with using an ordinary term in a technical way. Likewise the nature/nurture debate that has occupied so much of the history of psychology is simply beside the point on this issue. It is not because these achievements are both nature and nurture, but because they are neither. Nature and nurture are competing explanations for how certain sentences get stored in the brain. What Dewey is pointing to is that our interaction with the world is in real time. It exists only as long as one is interacting and disappears the moment one ceases to act. And not surprisingly, there is not much to introspect, because not all of what is happening is inside of the skin. Hence it should be no surprise that there is little introspectible content to perceptual-motor skills.
But how can familiarity be implemented if not as knowledge-like states? There are now two major candidates on the market for how the familiarity relationship can be implemented as a non-knowledge state. They are not independent of each other. There are hybrid versions. They are the dynamic systems approaches and the 'musculature set' theories. I am not taking a position on which, if any, of these provides the correct analysis.
